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JURISDICTION
The parties submit the present dispute to this Court by special
agreement. Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice provides that "jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases
which the parties refer to it. . . ." Therefore, this Court has jurisdic-
tion to resolve the issues presented in this dispute.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties have agreed to the Statement of Facts filed with the
Court.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The general issue put before this Court is to determine what prin-
ciples of international law are applicable to the parties in the delimita-
tion of their adjacent continental shelves, and how the principles
should be applied.
Specifically, this Court must consider
I. Whether any prior international agreements affect the
delimitation.
II. Whether the governing principle of international law is the equi-
table principle.
III. What are the relevant circumstances which must be considered in
order to reach a delimitation in accord with the principles this
Court determines applicable.
IV. Whether interim relief is necessary to protect New Togo's rights.
19811
N.Y.J. Int'l & Comp. L.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both the 1948 colonial treaty and the New Benin-New Togo
treaty have an impact on the delimitation of the continental shelf be-
tween New Togo and New Ghana. The 1948 treaty affects the point
from which the continental shelf delimitations should begin. New
Togo's 1979 municipal legislation conforms with the 1948 treaty and
general principles of international law. New Ghana, on the other hand,
has violated this treaty and the principle of pacta sunt servanda by
defining its boundary with New Togo as an equidistant line.
The method of delimitation used in the New Benin-New Togo
treaty complies with regional and customary international law and in-
fluences the proportionality of the continental shelf delimitation be-
tween New Togo and New Ghana. Lack of protest by New Ghana
makes the method of delimitation used in the treaty opposable to New
Ghana.
As New Togo is not a party to the 1958 Geneva Conventions, cus-
tomary law governs this controversy. Therefore, the boundary must be
delimited in accordance with equitable principles, taking all significant
features of the context into account. It is contrary to customary inter-
national law to mechanically project an equidistant line as New Ghana
has done.
The existence of the Ancient New Oti Riverbed does not affect
the present delimitation since it causes no disruption in the essential
continuity of the continental shelf. In contrast to the lack of influence
exerted by the riverbed, Keta Island creates a grossly disproportionate
distortion on the boundary. Accordingly, equitable principles require
that the island not be used as a basepoint. The equity of such a proce-
dure is buttressed by other factors including, inter alia, Keta Island's
geology and socio-economic relation to New Ghana's mainland.
New Togo's historic title and preferential rights to the living re-
sources in the New Lom6 Rock area are particularly compelling cir-
cumstances to be considered. To deprive a developing nation of a pri-
mary source of food insults the law which requires delimitation in
accordance with equitable principles. Similarly, the existence of hydro-
carbons on the natural prolongation of New Togo's mainland presents
a factor militating in favor of New Togo's suggested boundary.
[Vol. H
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
This Court has been asked to delimit the boundary between the
continental shelves of New Ghana and New Togo. Complying with ac-
cepted state practice *1 both parties claim a 200-mile exclusive fishery
zone and sovereign rights to the adjacent continental shelf. Therefore,
this matter is not in dispute and it is only the lateral boundary which
must be delimited by this Court according to the principles it finds
applicable. In order to assist this Court in its task, New Togo respect-
fully submits that the following are the relevant factors and principles
affecting the delimitation of the continental shelf between New Togo
and New Ghana.
I. PRIOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AFFECT THE
DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF ADJA-
CENT TO NEW TOGO AND NEW GHANA.
A. THE 1948 COLONIAL TREATY WHICH ESTABLISHED
THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN NEW TOGO AND NEW
GHANA TO A POINT THREE MILES EAST OF KETA
ISLAND IS BINDING ON THE PARTIES TO THIS
DISPUTE.
While States cannot be automatically bound by the agreements of
their colonial powers by virtue of the doctrine of state succession,2 New
Togo and New Ghana, having agreed to be bound by the 1948 treaty
are obliged under the principle of pacta aunt servandas to acknowl-
edge the treaty as controlling within the area to which it applies. The
treaty states that the boundary "run in a southerly direction following
the middle of the navigable channel of the New Oti River south to the
Atlantic Ocean." New Togo submits that this treaty established a
boundary to a point three nautical miles east of Keta Island and affects
the point from which continental shelf delimitation should begin.
1. See 10 Nzw DURECTONS IN THE LAw OF THz SA, 472-478 (M. Nordquist ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as LAw OF TiH SEA].
2. Keith, Succession to Bilateral Treaties by Seceding State, 61 AM. J. INT'L L.
521 (1967); see also I BRoWNLIE, Pwmcmza Or Punuc INTEENATiONAL LAW (2d ed. 1973)
645 [hereinafter cited as BROWNLMI; G. TuNKIN, TmoRy o INTERNATIONAL LAw (1974).
3. BROWNLM, supra note 2, at 595; see also B. CmzNG, GNMMAL PRINCwSS OF
LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL Cours AND TRmIUNALS 112 (1953); L. OPPNHmIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 794 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht, 1955) [hereinafter cited as OI1mmMl;
L. McNmR, THE LAw OF TREATIEs 493 (2d rev. ed. 1969).
1981]
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1. Interpretation of the 1948 Treaty According to Gen-
eral Principles of International Law Denies Any Jus-
tification for the Boundary Described in The New
Ghana Ocean Resources Act in 1978.
The Ocean Resources Act described New Ghana's eastern bound-
ary as "an equidistant line between the habitable land territories of
New Ghana and New Togo." As the 1948 treaty is controlling to a point
three miles east of Keta Island, New Ghana has no jurisdiction to pre-
scribe a boundary utilizing an equidistant line in this area or to extend
that line over the continental shelf. Nor can New Ghana invoke its
contrary municipal law as justification for its failure to abide by the
1948 agreement (lex posteriori), as this Court must apply international
law.'
The textual approach to treaty interpretation adopted by this
Court requires that a treaty be interpreted in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the treaty as a whole.5 The purpose of the
treaty was to establish a mutual boundary between New Togo and New
Ghana. This boundary was established in terms of the thalweg - the
middle of the navigable channel. Since the thalweg emerges from the
mouth of the New Oti River, it is clear that the boundary must also
extend beyond the mouth of the New Oti River. Subsequent practice
by England and New Ghana supports this interpretation. England, in
1951, and later New Ghana placed a series of buoys along the navigable
channel thereby indicating their interpretation of the 1948 treaty.
At the time the agreement was contracted, both France and Eng-
land recognized territorial seas of three nautical miles around their ter-
ritories and islands. As state sovereignty extends beyond the land terri-
tory and internal waters to the territorial seas,6 it is clear that the
parties intended to establish a boundary to the extent of the territory
over which they exercised sovereignty. Therefore, interpreting the
treaty in light of the rules of general international law in force at the
time of its conclusion,7 the reasonable interpretation is that the bound-
4. Article 38, Statute of the International Court Of Justice, October 24, 1945, 19
U.S.T. 5450, T.I.A.S. No. 6524, at art. 38(1)(a); G. SCHWZENBERGER, 1 INTRRNATIONAL
LAW As APPLiED By INTERNATIONAL CouRTs AND TRuBUNALs 509 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as SCHWARz&NEzEROR].
5. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedures of the International Court of Justice:
Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 33 Barr. Y.B. IW,'L L 203, 218
(1957); BnowNum, supra note 2, at 607; M. McDouGAL, H. LASswL, J. Mnxuz, Tim
lNTRRPRifATION Or AGRsEmEm AND WoRLD PUBLIc ORDER (1967).
6. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29,
1958, 15 US.T. 1601, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
7. Baowmm, supra note 2, at 607.
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ary runs along the thalweg emerging from the mouth of the New Oti
River and extends in a southerly direction through the territorial sea to
a point where it meets the Atlantic Ocean three nautical miles east of
Keta Island.
2. Even If the 1948 Boundary Had Terminated at the
Mouth of the New Oti River, the Presence of the
Thalweg Would Have Required a Departure From the
Equidistant Line.
The existence of a channel of navigation is one of the special cir-
cumstances specifically referred to in the International Law Commis-
sion Report of 1953' as necessitating a departure from the equidistant
line. However, the thalweg principle cannot be used to extend that
boundary to the continental shelf as the underlying rationale of the
thalweg is equal distribution of navigable waters. The thalweg princi-
ple has no utility in the high seas where freedom of navigation exists
and no relevance to delimitation of the continental shelf.'
3. The Boundary Line Codified by New Togo's 1979 Do-
mestic Legislation is in Accordance With the 1948
Treaty and General Principles of International Law.
Because the thalweg principle cannot be used to extend the
boundary from the terminal point of the colonial treaty, the 1948
boundary must be extended south and east around Keta Island at a
distance of three nautical-miles, giving effect to the breadth of territo-
rial sea recognized in 1948, until it intersects a line drawn due south
from the thalweg at the mouth of the New Oti River. It is from this
point that the Court must delimit the continental shelf boundary. This
line complies with the general principle that pre-independence bound-
aries established by law remain in being, uti possidetis ° which has
been adopted by governments and tribunals concerned with bounda-
ries in Africa and Asia."1 In addition, this line is in accordance with
8. [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 261.
9. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934); BocGs, bITRNATtoNAL BouNDA-
rs 191 (1940).
10. C. Hvnu, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIELY As IwnrTRnTsD AND APPLmD By THE
UNrrED STATms 498 (2d ed. 1945); Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier
Land, [1959] I.C.J. 209; see also BnowNLm, supra note 2, at 137.
11. O.A.U. Resolution on Border Disputes, 21 July 1964; Case of Temple of
Preah Vihear, [19621 I.C.J. 16; Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India and Pakistan), 7 INr'L
LEGAL MATEmALs 633 (1968).
1981]
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good policy"3 and takes into account the historic rights of New Togo in
the area. It is a settled principle of law that a state of things which
actually exists and has existed for a long time should be changed as
little as possible.1 3 The boundary line codified by New Togo's 1979 mu-
nicipal legislation conforms with the 1948 treaty and with these princi-
ples of international law.
B. THE NEW BENIN-NEW TOGO TREATY COMPLIES
WITH REGIONAL AND CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND IS OPPOSABLE TO NEW GHANA.
While a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a
third party without its consent,' a rule set forth in a treaty is binding
on non-parties if it is a customary rule of international law."
1. The New Benin-New Togo Treaty is in Accordance
with Regional Custom and General Customary Inter-
national Law.
Even though a treaty may be restricted in its application to a
small number of States, it may nevertheless represent a source of re-
gional international law.16 The rule need not be practiced long or uni-
versally, but it must be consistently and uniformly practiced and be
generally recognized as obligatory. 7 The method of delimitation uti-
lized in the New Benin-New Togo treaty complies with regional inter-
national law as it is generally recognized as obligatory by States in the
region. 8 New Togo enacted municipal legislation in 1979 employing
12. McDougal and Burke, The Community Interest in a Narrow Territorial Sea:
Inclusive versus Exclusive Competence Over the Oceans, 45 CORNEUL L.Q. 171 (1960).
13. Grisbadarna case (Norway v. Sweden), 1 Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121, 130
(1916).
14. D. O'CONNELL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAw 246 (2d ed. 1970)[hereinafter cited as
O'CONNmLL]; Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, [1926] P.C.I.J., ser.A, No.
7.
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980,
U.N. Conf. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, at art. 38; O'CoNNmL, supra note 14 at 23; see also
BROWNLE, supra note 2, at 601; SCHWABZENERGER, supra note 4, at 421.
16. The Asylum Case, [19501 I.C.J. 266, 276; The Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (SouthwestAfrica), [1971] I.C.J.
31; Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 53 (1974);
D'Amato, Concept of Special Custom in International Law, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 211
(1969).
17. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 376
(1950); see also J. Banmzy, Tim LAw or NATIONS 1-7, 41-49 (6th ed. 1963); BROWNLIE,
supra note 2, at 6; OPEmnHwM, supra note 3, at 15-23.
18 National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
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this method, not because it had been consented to, but because New
Togo believed it to be binding.
Under this Court's decision in North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases [hereinafter the North Sea cases] "any other continental shelf
delimitations between adjacent States in the region"1' must be taken
into account in determining the reasonable degree of proportionality
effected by a delimitation according to equitable principles. New
Benin's boundary treaties with its neighbors proportions the shelf eq-
uitably among the coastal States in the region and the New Togo-New
Ghana line should reflect this consideration.
2. Acquiescence Makes the New Benin-New Togo Treaty
Opposable to New Ghana.
Acquiescence, recognition or estoppel may make a treaty con-
cluded between others opposable to a non-party. 0 Negotiations for the
1975 treaty began in 1973. During that time New Ghana was involved
in exploring areas of the continental shelf. As this treaty affected New
Ghana's vital interests in the area, New Ghana cannot plead igno-
rances or indifference to the negotiations and the rule of delimitation
employed in the treaty. Lack of protest made the treaty opposable to
New Ghana.
II. THE RELEVANT PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO THE DELIMITATION OF THE CONTI-
NENTAL SHELF IS THE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE.
There are no multilateral treaties or conventions to which both
States are parties, although both are members of the United Nations
and are currently participating in the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea; therefore, customary international law gov-
erns in the present dispute. A determination of the boundary in accor-
dancq with equitable principles, taking all significant features of the
context into account, is the customary rule of boundary delimitation."2
It is contrary to customary international law to automatically project
an equidistant line to delimit the continental shelf between two adja-
cent States. The principle of equidistance is subordinate and may only
ST/LEG/SER. B/18 (1976).
19. North Sea Continental Shelf Cam, [19691 I.C.J. 3 at par. 101(D)(3) [herein-
after cited as North Sea cases].
20. SCHWAZENBRGM, aupra note 4, at 461.
21. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116 at 138.
22. North Sea cases, supra note 19, at par. 101.
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be used when it results in an equitable delimitation.
In considering the legal basis of the continental shelf doctrine, it
is important to note that the question of what may be claimed as the
continental shelf is distinct from the question of who may claim it."3
The continental shelf in its geological sense is that submerged portion
of the land mass which slopes gently seaward to a point where a sud-
den increase in steepness takes place to the ocean floor.24 The juridical
continental shelf, which is at issue here, is that part of the seabed that
lies beyond the State's territorial sea boundary; however, the legal sta-
tus of the superjacent waters as high seas is not affected .2
A. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN PART OF THE
DOCTRINE OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF SINCE
ITS INCEPTION.
The doctrine of the continental shelf was first enunciated in the
Truman Proclamation of 1945, which established jurisdiction over the
continental shelf and provided for delimitation in accordance with eq-
uitable principles.' Shortly thereafter many States followed this exam-
ple and state practice quickly matured into customary international
law.' 7
B. THE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE DOCTRINE WAS AU-
THORITATIVELY APPLIED BY THIS COURT IN THE
NORTH SEA CASES.
The most authoritative application of equitable principles as the
customary law of boundary delimitation is found in the North Sea
cases where this Court, having found Article 6 of the 1958 Convention
on the Continental Shelf" to be inapplicable as between the parties,
held:
delimitation is to be effected by agreement in ac-
23. Note, Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Jurisdiction Between States:
The Effect of Physical Irregularities in the Natural Continental Shelf, 17 VA. J. INT'L -
L. 77, 85 (1976).
24. A. SIALowrM, I SHORE & SKA BOUNDARUS 183 (1962).
25. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 1, 3 [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf
Convention).
26. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation).
27. Z. SLOUKA, INrmERATONAL CuSToM AND rm CONT NTAL SmLF (1968); see
also BRowmi, supra note 2, at 6; H.G. Kmowr, Tim LAw oW rm SzA:CAsMS, DocuMENTs
AND RzADINGS 457 (1976).
28. Continental Sheff Convention, supra note 25.
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cordance with equitable principles, and taking
into account of all the relevant circumstances in
such a way as to leave as much as possible to each
Party all those parts of its continental shelf that
constitute a natural prolongation of its land terri-
tory into and under the sea, without encroach-
ment on the natural prolongation of the land ter-
ritory of the other.*'
In rejecting the assertion that the equidistance principle, as embodied
in Article 6, was customary law, this Court noted that from the begin-
ning the opinio juris had been that delimitation must be in accordance
with equitable principles.80
C. THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE NORTH SEA
CASES HAVE BEEN RECENTLY REAFFIRMED IN
THE ANGLO-FRENCH ARBITRATION CASE.31
In the 1977, Anglo-French Arbitration the court declared that as
the provisions of Article 6 do not define the conditions for the applica-
tion of the equidistance principle, the rules of customary law are a rele-
vant and even essential means both for interpreting and completing
the provisions of Article 6.83 Therefore, Article 6 even when it is appli-
cable, requires no automatic application of equidistance as it must
yield to special circumstances to effect an equitable delimitation. The
court rejected the notion of a presumption in favor of equidistance
stating, "the equidistance-special circumstance rule and the rule of
customary law have the same object - the delimitation of the boundary
in accordance with equitable principles.""
D. OTHER STATE PRACTICES SUPPORT THE USE OF
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES.
Not only the Anglo-French Arbitration, but other recent state
practices, such as the Gulf of Maine Dispute" and the Saudi Arabia-
29. North Sea cases, supra note 19, at para. 101.
30. Id. at para. 85.
31. United Kingdom-France Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Arbitration
Agreement, Decision of June 30, 1977 [hereinafter cited as Anglo-French Arbitration].
32. Id. at para. 75.
33. Id.
34. Department of State Announcement of Maritime Boundary between United
States and Canada, 41 Fed. Reg. 48619 (1976) reprinted in 15 Iwr'L LsGAL MAmmuLS
1435 (1976).
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Iran agreement" among others, illustrates the opinio juris nature of
equitable principles. In addition, many States have included the use of
equitable principles in their municipal legislation." Clearly, the equi-
distance principle has not become the rule of customary international
law and it is applied only when it achieves a delimitation in accordance
with equitable principles.
E. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN INCORPO-
RATED INTO THE INFORMAL COMPOSITE NEGOTI-
ATING TEXT OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA.37
Article 83 of the ICNT states:
The delimitation of the continental shelf between
States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be
effected by agreement in conformity with interna-
tional law. Such an agreement shall be in accor-
dance with equitable principles, employing the
median or equidistance line, where appropriate,
and taking account of all circumstances prevailing
in the area concerned."
During the negotiations, Article 83 has survived various drafts with
only minor changes which clearly indicates the status of the equitable
principle doctrine as customary law. Also, this principle is closely
linked to the compulsory settlement procedures that are now an impor-
tant part of the Law of the Sea Conference.3 Application of equitable
principles results in a realistic and accurate delimitation by taking into
account such considerations as historical use and fishing rights.
F. APPLICATION OF EITHER EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
OR THE EQUIDISTANT-SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE
RULE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE LEAD TO THE
SAME RESULT.
35. Amin, Customary Rules of Delimitation of the Continental Shelf: The Gulf
States Practice, 11 J. MAnrrnm L. 509 (1980).
36. National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, 105 U.N.
Doe. ST/LEG/SER. B/18 (1976).
37. Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT/Rev. 3) U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/WP. 10 (Sept. 22, 1980)[hereinafter cited as ICNT].
3X Id. at srt. 83.
39. Adede, Toward the Formulation of the Rule of Delimitation of Sea Bounda-
ries Between States with Adjacent or Opposite Coasts, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 254 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Adede].
[Vol. II
Jessup Counter-Memorial
The fundamental concept on which the Court based its judgment
was that as the continental shelf was the natural prolongation of the
land-mass of the State from which it extends, justice to that State re-
quires an equitable delimitation.40 Therefore, in applying equitable
principles, not as a matter of abstract justice, but as a rule of law,"z the
factors considered must include geology, geography, unity of deposits
and proportionality."1 However, there is no legal limit to the considera-
tions which States may take account of for the purpose of achieving an
equitable delimitation' and the trend has been to expand the circum-
stances which may be considered in determining an equitable bound-
ary. Article 83 of the ICNT has replaced "relevant" circumstances with
"all" circumstances. In the present case, however, the rules of custom-
ary international law lead to much the same result as would applica-
tion of the equidistant-special circumstance rule, because the same fac-
tors which would constitute special circumstances are also
considerations which must be taken into account when employing equi-
table principles.
III. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES REQUIRE THAT ALL CIRCUM-
STANCES BE CONSIDERED.
A. THE ANCIENT NEW OTI RIVERBED DOES NOT CON-
STITUTE A BREAK IN THE ESSENTIAL GEOLOGI-
CAL CONTINUITY OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF.
The facts indicate that the seabed and subsoil of the continental
margin adjacent to the land territories have similar sedimentary char-
acteristics despite the fact that there is a minor depression in the area
known as the Ancient New Oti Riverbed. The riverbed should have no
bearing on the delimitation since it does not create a distinct break in
the natural prolongation of the continental shelf adjacent to the parties
in this dispute.
The Anglo-French Arbitration dealt with a similar geological fea-
ture known as the Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep Fault Zone. The Court re-
jected the United Kingdom's alternative propostion that the boundary
be established along the fault stating,
the geological fault... even if they be considered
as distinct features in the geomorphology of the
40. North 8ea case, supra note 19, at par. 55.
41. Id. at para. 85.
42. Id. at para. 101.
43. Id. at para. 93.
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shelf are still discontinuities in the seabed and
subsoil which do not disrupt the essential unity
of the continental shelf .... Moreover, to attach
any critical significance to the physical features
like the Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep Fault Zone in de-
limiting the continental shelf boundary would run
counter to the whole tendency of State practice
on the continental shelf in recent years."
Not only did the Court decline to delimit the boundary along this de-
pression, it also refused to consider it a special circumstance capable of
altering an equidistant line.
It is clear, therefore, that the presence of the Ancient New Oti
Riverbed should not figure into this Court's present delimitation.
1. The Natural Prolongation of the Land Territories Is
South.
Because there are no significant lateral divisions or other geologi-
cal distinctions in the continental shelf, this Court is justified in deter-
mining that the natural prolongation of the parties' land continues in
the direction of their land masses. As the Anglo-French Arbitration
court stated, "the concept of the continental shelf is a juridical concept
which connotes the natural prolongation under the sea not of a conti-
nent or geographical land mass but the land territory of each state."
Even the most cursory examination of the geography involved in this
dispute reveals that the land masses of both New Togo and New
Ghana extend directly south. It is therefore presumed that the juridical
natural prolongation extends south into the Atlantic Ocean. New
Ghana's blatant disregard of these facts cannot withstand judicial
scrutiny.
2. For the Purpose of Delimiting the Lateral Boundary,
the Principle of Natural Prolongation is Not Determi-
native.
Because the shelves of the two countries are indistinguishable,
the theory of natural prolongation is of limited usefulness for the pur-
pose of delimiting the continental shelf boundary.4" The principle of
44. Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 31, at para. 107. See e.g., Nweihed, EZ
(Uneasy) Delimitation in the Semi Enclosed Caribbean Sea: Recent Agreements Be-
tween Venzuela and Her Neighbors, 8 OcwA Dzv. INr'i. L. 1, 2 (1980).
45. Id. at para 174.191.
46. Blecher, Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf, 73 Am. J. Ir'u L 60,
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natural prolongation is not absolute and where the continental shelf of
two countries merge, other considerations, including law and equity,
must intervene."7
a. The theory of proportionality must be invoked.
One major consideration, first enunciated by this Court in North
Sea, was that an equitable delimitation should achieve a reasonable
degree of proportionality, which was described as the relation between
the lengths of the States' coastlines and the continental shelves to
which the States are therefore entitled." This concept of proportional-
ity assumes an even greater significance when, as here, the concept of
natural prolongation does not aid the parties in reaching an equitable
delimitation. Indeed, one authority has argued that in such an instance
proportionality rises to the level of an equitable principle."
While New Ghana may argue that the concept of proportionality
was limited by the Anglo-French Arbitration, this does not indicate
that proportionality is no longer relevant. Indeed, that Court stated:
The factor of proportionality may appear in the
form of the ratio between the areas of continen-
tal shelves to the lengths of the respective coast-
lines .... But it may also appear, and more usu-
ally does, as a factor to determining the
reasonable or unreasonable - the equitable or in-
equitable -- effects of particular geographical fea-
tures or configurations upon the course of an
equidistant line boundary."
b. New Ghana violated international law by delimiting
the boundary without regard to any degree of propor-
tionality.
Whether one applies proportionality as a general equitable princi-
ple or limits it to a remedial role of correcting distortions caused by
particular physical features, proportionality should be utilized in the
instant case. The boundary proposed by New Ghana does not reflect
even the most minimal degree of proportionality. While New Togo's
coastline is obviously much shorter than that of New Ghana (it is
62 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Blecher).
47. Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 31, at pares. 191, 194.
48. North Sea cases, supra note 19, at para. 101.
49. Blecher, supra note 46, at 77.
50. Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 31, at para. 100.
1981]
N.Y.J. Intl & Comp. L[
about one-sixth the length), the maritime boundary line which New
Ghana suggests leaves approximately half of New Togo's land mass
with no continental shelf whatsoever. Even under a restrictive reading
of proportionality such a result cannot be sustained, and proportional-
ity must be considered to remedy this obvious inequity.
B. KETA ISLAND IS A SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE AND
NEW GHANA VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY
USING IT AS A BASEPOINT FOR THE MECHANICAL
DETERMINATION OF AN EQUIDISTANT LINE.
1. Islands Constitute the Classic Example of Special
Circumstances.
It is beyond dispute that islands constitute the classic example of
a special circumstances1 calling for the application of equitable princi-
ples. Though a particular island may be used as a basepoint to delimit
the territorial sea, it does not necessarily follow that the island may
also be used as a basepoint for delimiting the continental shelf of the
country to which it belongs. This rule of distinction in treatment has
developed out of the recognition that the distortion which may be
caused on a small scale very likely becomes grossly inequitable when a
delimitation is extended 200 miles into the ocean."s
2. Keta Island is a Special Circumstance.
a. Using Keta Island as a basepoint radically distorts
the boundary.
Countries frequently attempt to use islands as basepoints because
to do so greatly increases the continental shelf thereby accorded the
mainland. However, if using an island as a basepoint causes a "radical
distortion of the boundary creative of inequity," international law
51. North Sea cases, supra note 19, at para. 13, 57; BRowmiz supra note 2, at
227; M. McDOUGAL & W. BuRn, Ta Punuc ORwaa OF Tuz OcMrs 436-37 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as McDouoAL ]; Brown, The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case, 16
SAN DIEGo L. Rzv. 461, 487-88 (1979); Gutteridge, The 1958 Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf, 35 Bart. Y.B. rr'L L. 102, 120 (1959); Karl, Islands and the Delimitation
of the Continental Shelf: A Framework for Analysis, 71 Am. J. INT'L L. 642, 648 (1977);
Padwa, Submarine Boundaries, 9 hWrL & Com1. L.Q.628, 647 (1960); [1953] 1 Y.B. INTrL
L. Comm. 128-32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1953.
52. North Sea cases, supra note 19, at para. 59; R. HODosoN, Islands: Normal
and Special Circumstances in LAw OF Tn Snf Tin EmzRoado Raoimu OF TH OCalS
137, 180-81 (J. Gamble & G. Pontecorvo eds. 1974).
53. Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 31, at para. 199.
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mandates that the distortion be corrected."
In the instant case, Keta Island clearly causes a radical distortion
in the boundary which would otherwise extend directly south. Using
Keta Island as a basepoint causes the boundary to swing extravagantly
westward, primarily because Keta Island is situated such that half of
its territory extends in front of New Togo's mainland.
b. Geographical facts indicate that Keta Island is a spe-
cial circumstance.
As indicated above, the location of Keta Island in front of New
Togo is a geographical fact which contributes to the inequity of a
boundary based on a strict equidistant line as drawn by New Ghana.
This Court has the power to weigh the effect of this geographical fact
since it bears on the equitable delimitation of the boundary.
In the Anglo-French Arbitration the court considered whether the
westward extension of the Scilly Isles rendered the equidistant bound-
ary inequitable. There, the court stated that the fact that the Scillies
caused a major deflection in the boundary
does not in itself suffice to justify a boundary
other than an equidistance line delimited by ref-
erence to the Scillies. The question is whether, in
light of all the pertinent geographical circum-
stances that fact amounts to an inequitable dis-
tortion of the equidistance line producing dispro-
portionate effects on the areas of shelf accruing to
the two States.58
Additionally, the Court found with regard to the Channel Islands that
their location so close to the French coast constituted a special circum-
stance creative of inequity." The overall geographical setting, there-
fore, is clearly relevant to this Court's determination.
Examination of the geography involved in the present dispute
reveals that there are numerous geographical bases for classifying Keta
Island as a special circumstance. Its one-dimensional coastline is very
short compared to New Ghana's overall coastline. Its particular loca-
tion, with a very narrow band extending in front of New Togo, causes a
radical deflection in the boundary. New Togo has no comparable island
which serves as a counter-balance to Keta Island.
54. North Sea cases, supra note 19, at para. 57.
56. Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 31, at para. 243.
56. Id. at para. 197.
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c. Keta Island is geographically distinct from New
Ghana's mainland and from the appurtenant conti-
nental shelf.
Another factor which contributes to making Keta Island a special
circumstance is her geology. The facts indicate that Keta Island is
made of sand, which is significant for two reasons. First, it indicates
that the island is not a geological extension of New Ghana's mainland
and there is, therefore, little justification for allowing this narrow strip
of sand to greatly increase New Ghana's continental shelf at the ex-
pense of New Togo. In North Sea, this Court adopted the fundamental
principle that the continental shelf is the natural prolongation of the
land territories. Implicit in that concept is the notion that land domi-
nates the seas;' 7 therefore, the natural prolongation of the mainland
subordinates considerations of small dependent, geologically distinct
islands and Keta Island should not be permitted to increase New
Ghana's overall shelf.
Second, because Keta Island is made of sand, it is geologically
distinct from the surrounding continental shelf. Clearly, then, Keta Is-
land cannot claim any of the shelf as its natural prolongation.
d. Other factors establish that Keta Island is a special
circumstance.
The facts indicate that Keta Island is not an independent entity
but is, rather, economically and politically allied with the mainland of
New Ghana. A small portion of New Ghana's total population (less
than 1 per cent) live on the island and some of these inhabitants com-
mute daily to work on the mainland.
However, this alliance does not signify that New Ghana may ex-
tend its continental shelf utilizing Keta Island as a basepoint and, in-
deed, these factors miliate [sic] against such a procedure. In the Anglo-
French Arbitration, the court took notice of the fact that the Channel
Islands were populous, of certain economic and political importance
and were dependent on the United Kingdom for security and defense
purposes." Nonetheless, the court found these factors were not signifi-
cant enough to justify the distortion which would result if the Channel
Islands were used as basepoints for delimitation.
Given the context of the present dispute, equitable principles
mandate that Keta Island be ignored. It is geographically obscure; geo-
graphically and economically insignificant; and it has no unique secur-
57. North Sea cases, supra note 19, at para. 96.
58. Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 31, at para. 197.
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ity or defense interests which are not adequately protected by accord-
ing it a band of territorial sea and allowing it to sit on the continental
shelf of New Ghana's mainland.
3. New Ghana Has Violated Equitable Principles By Us-
ing Keta Island as a Basepoint.
New Togo submits that in light of the factors enumerated above,
Keta Island is a special circumstance and equitable principles require
that it be disregarded for the purpose of delimiting the continential
shelf. Such a result was adhered to by the Anglo-French Arbitration
with regard to the Channel Islands and is supported by other state
practice"' and equitable principles.
C. THE EQUIDISTANT BOUNDARY PROPOSED BY NEW
GHANA THREATENS NEW TOGO'S ECONOMY AND
VIOLATES ITS FISHERY RIGHTS.
1. Claims of Exclusive Fishery Zone and Rights to the
Continental Shelf Affect the Exploitation of Both
Oysters and Fish.
The facts indicate that important oyster beds and fin fisheries are
located in the area around New Lom6 Rock. In order to reach an equi-
table delimitation these valuable resources must be carefully consid-
ered, since both parties claim 200-mile exclusive fishery zones and
rights to the adjacent continental shelf. Oysters, being of the sedentary
species" belong to whichever country controls the continental shelf,61
and under emerging customary law there is no requirement that the
coastal state share these resources with others.6 The fish pose a re-
lated though somewhat different problem. Under traditional law coun-
tries could not claim ownership over fish and under the freedom of the
high seas concept, whoever caught the fish obtained legal title to them.
That freedom, however, is changing and under newly developing law, a
claim to a 200-mile fishery zone entitles the coastal State to regulate
59. Small islands have been ignored in delimitations between Bahrain-Saudi
Arabia; Norway-Soviet Union; Abu-Dhabi-Qatar; Iran-Qatar. See N. Ely, Seabed Bound-
aries Between Costal States: The Effect to be Given Islets as "Special Circumstances",
6 INT'L LAw 219, 228-30 (1972).
60. Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accom-
plished. 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 607, 621 (1958).
61. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 25, art. 2(4); see also OpmNmuM,
supra note 3, at 576.
62. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 25, at art. 2; ICNT, supra note 37,
at art. 77.
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exploitation of fish resources." s Any assertion by New Ghana that New
Togo's needs could be fulfilled by agreement between the countries
must be regarded as self-serving since New Ghana would be under no
obligation to permit New Togo's continued exploitation of the fisheries.
Therefore, in consideration of New Togo's established rights to the
oyster beds and fin fisheries, as detailed below, and in light of emerging
customary international law which allocates substantially greater con-
trol to the coastal State, equitable principles demand that the area
around New Lom6 Rock be included within the territory of New Togo.
2. New Ghana's Proposed Boundary Violates the His-
toric Rights of New Togo.
Historic rights have long been recognized as a special circum-
stance. In 1909 the Grisbadarna Arbitration" noted that "fishing has
been carried on since a time much more remote, by... fishermen who
were inhabitants of Sweden."" Therefore, the court concluded that be-
cause the fisheries were first and most effectively exploited by Sweden,
they should be included in the territorial sea of that country. More
recently, the United Kingdom-Norway Fisheries Case" found that
historic rights must be considered in establishing a territorial sea.
That New Togo's exploitation of the fisheries surrounding New
Lom6 Rock constitutes historic use is beyond question. Coastal ethnic
groups from New Togo have long exploited the living resources in the
vicinity of New Lom6 Rock, which the parties agree belongs to New
Togo. This historic use is entitled to weight in the present
delimitation.
3. New Ghana's Proposed Boundary Threatens the Pref-
erential Rights of New Togo.
International law provides that a state's unique dependence on its
fisheries constitutes a special circumstance. In the recent Fisheries Ju-
risdiction cases 7 the Court observed that the concept of preferential
63. Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Press Release, NV/185
(June 9, 1970) reprinted in 64 Am. J. It"L L. 1021 (1970); see also ICNT, supra note 37,
at art. 56.
64. Grisbadarna, supra note 13.
65. Id. at 130.
66. (19511 I.C.J. 116.
67. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1974] I.C.J. 3 (United Kingdom v. Ice-
land)[hereinafter UK-Iceland Fisheries case]; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (1974] LC.J.
175 (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland).
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rights had crystallized into customary international law.es This doc-
trine recognizes that a coastal state may claim preferential rights when
it is "in a situation of special dependence on coastal fisheries."9 The
court noted that a state's special dependence may relate not only to
the livelihood of its citizens but also to its economic development as
well.70
In the case of New Togo, fishing is a primary source of economic
life. The average annual per capita income is less than half that of New
Ghana. It is an underdeveloped country whose people would suffer
substantially were this valuable source of food withdrawn. In contrast,
New Ghana has a stronger and more diverse economy based on mining,
forestry and agriculture. There is no indication that New Ghana relies
on the living resources of the ocean.
D. NEW LOMEk ROCK IS A SIGNIFICANT FEATURE TO
BE CONSIDERED IN THE DELIMITATION.
Although New Ghana fully concedes that New Lom6 Rock be-
longs to New Togo, it fails to accord the rock any significance in the
present delimitation. This violates international law in several respects.
First, as established above New Togo has been and continues to be
uniquely dependent on the living resources surrounding the rock, thus
establishing historic and preferential rights to the area.
Second, if New Ghana insists on drawing a strict equidistant line,
New Lom6 Rock must be given status as a basepoint. In a similar situ-
ation the Anglo-French Arbitration decided that Eddystone Rock, lo-
cated off the coast of England, had to be used as a basepoint.7 This
ruling is of interest because it allowed a rock of less significance than
New Lom6 to be utilized as a basepoint at a time when such rock was
not even allocated a territorial sea. Today, emerging international law
indicates that even uninhabited rocks are entitled to a territorial sea.'7
Third, New Ghana has grossly violated international law by not
even complying with the most minimal requirements - that New
Lom6 Rock be given a territorial sea.
68. UK-Iceland Fisheries case, supra note 67, at para. 52; see Arrangements Re-
lating to Fisheries in Waters Surrounding the Fare Islands, 4 LAw Or THE SEA, supra
note 1, at 171; The Agreement on the Regulation of the Fishing of North-East Artic
(Arcto-Norwegian) Cod, Mar. 15, 1974, Norway-U.S.S.R.-United Kingdom Treaty Series
No. 35 (1974).
69. UK-Iceland Fisheries case, supra note 67, at para. 52.
70. Id. at para. 70.
71. Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 31, at pars. 144.
72. ICNT, supra note 37, at art. 121(3).
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E. ROADSTEADS DO NOT AFFECT CONTINENTAL
SHELF DELIMITATIONS.
Roadsteads are areas of water73 and do not relate to the use or
exploration of the submerged seabed; therefore, they should have no
effect on the delimitation of the continental shelf. At most, roadsteads
have been permitted to create enclaves of territorial sea where they
might otherwise be located outside the jurisdiction of the State.'4 How-
ever, this practice has not been extended to the buoyed channel" con-
necting the roadstead to the port. Under the peculiar facts of this case,
not only is the roadstead irrelevant for delimitation of the continental
shelf, the roadstead should not be considered within New Ghana's ter-
ritorial sea.
When England established the roadstead in 1951, it only claimed
a three mile territorial sea as did France, therefore, the roadstead was
entirely beyond the territorial sea of either colonial power and was not
at that time a source of potential conflict. While today both New
Ghana and New Togo assert twelve mile territorial seas, the boundary
in this area has long been established; therefore, the roadstead still lies
outside the territorial seas of either party.
Nautical charts produced by England and, later, New Ghana were
issued as aids to navigation and were not assertions of sovereignty suf-
ficient to establish a prescriptive title. Prescription is not readily avail-
able as a root of title when the boundary has long been ascertained and
beyond dispute.7" Lack of protest by France and later by New Togo,
under the circumstances, did not amount to acquiescence since there
was no situation calling for protest.77 That New Togo asked permission
to use the roadstead does not indicate abdication of present or future
title, particularly when this request was made only three times in
thirty years; while New Togo has permitted New Ghana to exercise
acts of administration over the area, title remains indisputably with
New Togo. Thus, neither the presence of the roadstead or of the
bouyed channel affect the delimitation of the continental shelf.
73. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1492 (4th ed. 1951); 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST O,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 263-65 (1965)[hereinafter cited as WHrTmAu].
74. 4 WHITEMAN, supra note 73, at 270-71.
75. McDoUoGL, supra note 51, at 426.
76. O'CONNELL, supra note 14, at 424.
77. Id. at 425.
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F. MINERAL RESOURCES IN THE AXIM BLOCK ARE
A FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE
DELIMITATION.
Another factor adverted to in North Sea as relevant to continen-
tal shelf delimitation is natural resources.76 While the Court did not
elaborate on this point, the clear implication was that an equitable de-
limitation between two States might well be affected by natural re-
sources.7 ' In light of the directive of the Anglo-French arbitral tribunal
to achieve a balancing of the equities,"e it is evident that the severely
skewed distribution of resources which would here result by applica-
tion of the equidistance principle would frustrate that objective and,
therefore, justifies deviation from a boundary so delimited. The known
existence of mineral resources in the Axim Block area is a special cir-
cumstance compelling distribution thereof so as to do equity to both
New Togo and New Ghana.
Such an equitable result can best be accomplished by delimita-
tion along the 1979 line issued by New Togo, for this boundary would
yield an equitable distribution of resources between the two States.
New Ghana already possesses significant land mineral resources which
it actively exploits. Conversely, New Togo is without any terrestrial
mineral deposits and is, therefore, more dependent on those resources
located within its continental shelf.
Any assertion by New Ghana that the unity of mineral deposits is
a factor militating against the delimitation urged by New Togo is un-
tenable. As stated by Judge Ammoun in North Sea, "if the preserva-
tion of the unity of deposits is a matter of concern to the parties, they
must provide for this by a voluntary agreement... , and this does not
fall within the category of a factor or rule of delimitation.""'
1. New Togo Has Not Consented to New Ghana's Ex-
ploitation of Axim Block.
Rights over the continental shelf are exclusive in the sense that
no one may undertake exploitation without the express consent of the
coastal state.82 Any assertion by New Ghana that New Togo has acqui-
esced in New Ghana's exploitation of Axim Block is completely devoid
78. North Sea cases, supra note 19, at para. 54.
79. Blecher, supra note 46, at 65.
80. Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 31, at para. 187.
81. North Sea cases, aupra note 19, at 149 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion).
82. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 25, at art. 2; see also ICNT, supra
note 37, at art. 77.
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of merit. New Togo officially protested such activity in 1978. Reliance
on early comments by government officials as an indication of New
Togo's acquiescence is entirely misplaced. The present facts are clearly
distinguishable from the Nuclear Test Cases83 which found official pro-
nouncements by French government officials sufficiently binding to
award an order of interim relief prohibiting France from carrying out
planned nuclear tests. The statements in the Nuclear Test Cases indi-
cating that France did not envisage cancelling nuclear tests included
official pronouncements, diplomatic correspondence and statements in
Parliament.8 4 In addition, those comments were invoked so as to per-
mit this Court to order interim relief from a potentially life threatening
situation. The extraordinary situation presented in that case cannot be
equated with newspaper articles regarding the possible benefit of ex-
ploitation for minerals. To hold such comments binding on New Togo
for the purpose of affecting a permanent maritime boundary surely ex-
aggerates the limited applicability of the Nuclear Test Cases.
IV. THIS COURT IS COMPETENT TO GRANT INTERIM
RELIEF.
Under Article 41 of the Statute of the I.C.J." this Court may
grant interim relief necessary to preserve the rights of a party and this
Court and its predecessor have exercised such power in numerous in-
stances.86 New Ghana has threatened to "use all means available to it,
including force if necessary" to prevent New Togo's planned exploita-
tion of Axim Block. Such conduct would violate Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter which states "all members shall refrain from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state. 687 Because this conduct endangers interna-
tional peace, New Ghana must be enjoined from using or threatening
to use force against New Togo.
New Togo also requests that New Ghana be enjoined from con-
tinuing to exploit hydrocarbons in the contested area. Parties to a de-
83. [19731 I.C.J. 99.
84. Id. at para. 25, 26.
85. Statute of the International Court of Justice, October 24, 1945, 19 U.S.T.
5450, T.I.A.S. No. 6529, at art. 41.
86. See United States Application and Request for Interim Measures of Protec-
tion in Proceeding Against Iran, [1979] I.C.J. -, reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATEm-
Ads 1464 (1979); Nuclear Test cases, supra note 83; Chorzow Factory Case (merits),
[1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17.
87. U.N. CHnrmR, 16 U.S.T. 1134, T.I.A.S. No. 5857, art. 2(4); see also ICNT
supra note 37, art. 279.
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limitation dispute are required to refrain from exploitation until the
resolution of the controversy."
V. PRAYERS FOR REJECTION OF THE APPLICATION AND
FOR NECESSARY ORDERS.
In view of the facts and arguments presented in the Counter-Me-
morial, may it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
1. That delimitation in accord with equitable principles, taking
account of all circumstances, subsists as the principle governing conti-
nental shelf delimitations and is binding between disputants.
2. That the circumstances enumerated by New Togo as relevant
to the equitable delimitation are correctly identified and applied and,
therefore, that the boundary be delimited as submitted by New Togo.
3. In the alternative, that even if this Court declares the appli-
cable law to be the equidistance-special circumstances rule, New Togo
has identified and applied the special circumstances to the equidistant
line so as to reach a boundary in accord with the equidistant-special
circumstances rule.
4. That in the event the boundary is delimited so that New
Lom6 Rock is located within the New Ghana boundary, that New
Togo's historic and preferential rights to the living resources in the
area by [sic] recognized and that exploitation be permitted to continue
status quo ante.
New Togo further requests that in recognition of the grave harm
which might result from certain activities of New Ghana, this Court
grant interim relief to the effect that:
1. New Ghana be enjoined from using or threatening to use
force against New Togo. 2. New Ghana be enjoined from exploitation
of Axim Block until adjudication on the merits and a final delimitation
of the continental shelf boundary.
Respectfully submitted,
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88. Adede, supra note 39, at 237; Nelson, Equity and the Delimitation of Mari-
time Boundaries, 11 IRwu Rev. Imr% Ra,. 197, 212-213 (1978).
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